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Abstract 13 
We investigated the efficiency of attack strategies to network nodes when targeting several 14 
complex model and real-world networks. We tested 5 attack strategies, 3 of which were 15 
introduced in this work for the first time, to attack 3 model (Erdos and Renyi, Barabasi and 16 
Albert preferential attachment network, and scale-free network configuration models) and 17 
3 real networks (Gnutella peer-to-peer network, email network of the University of Rovira 18 
i Virgili, and immunoglobulin interaction network). Nodes were removed sequentially 19 
according to the importance criterion defined by the attack strategy. We used the size of 20 
the largest connected component (LCC) as a measure of network damage. We found that 21 
the efficiency of attack strategies (fraction of nodes to be deleted for a given reduction of 22 
LCC size) depends on the topology of the network, although attacks based on the number 23 
of connections of a node and betweenness centrality were often the most efficient 24 
strategies. Sequential deletion of nodes in decreasing order of betweenness centrality was 25 
the most efficient attack strategy when targeting real-world networks. In particular for 26 
networks with power-law degree distribution, we observed that most efficient strategy 27 
change during the sequential removal of nodes. 28 
29 
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1. Introduction 30 
The resilience of real-world complex networks, such as Internet, electrical power grids, 31 
airline routes, ecological and biological networks [1,2,3,4,5,6] to “node failure” (i.e. node 32 
malfunctioning or removal) is a topic of fundamental importance for both theoretical and 33 
applied network science. Node failure can cause the fragmentation of the network, which 34 
has consequences in terms of system performance, properties, and architecture, such as 35 
transportation properties, information delivery efficiency and the reachability of network 36 
components (i.e. ability to go from node of the network to another) [3].  37 
Several studies [3,7,8,9] have investigated the resilience of model networks using a 38 
number of “attack strategies”, i.e. a sequence of node removal according to certain 39 
properties of the nodes [2,3,7]. A widely-applied attack strategy consists in first ranking 40 
the nodes with respect to an importance criterion (e.g. number of connections or some 41 
measures of centrality) and then remove the nodes sequentially from the most to the least 42 
important according to the chosen criterion until the network either becomes disconnected 43 
or loses some essential qualities [3,10]. However, little is known on how the efficiency (i.e. 44 
fraction of nodes to be deleted for a given change in the network) of attack strategies 45 
varies when considering differing real-world and model networks.  46 
In addition, an interesting - although underappreciated - issue is how the relative 47 
efficiency of attack strategies may change during the attack. For example, an attack 48 
strategy might be more efficient when the targeted (i.e. under attack) network is still 49 
pristine, while other strategies might be more efficient when the network has already been 50 
fragmented and some of its properties been compromised. Testing the efficiency of the 51 
different attack strategies when targeting different networks may also allow to identify the 52 
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most important nodes for network functioning, and therefore which nodes should be 53 
primarily protected, as in the case of computer  [11] or ecological networks [6,12,13,14], or 54 
removed, as in the case of immunization/disease networks [15].  55 
In this work, we test the efficiency of both well-known attack strategies and new strategies 56 
introduced for the first time in this paper when targeting either model or real-world 57 
networks, using the size of the largest connected component (LCC) (i.e. the largest number 58 
of nodes connected among them in the network, [2]) as a measure of network damage. We 59 
found for model networks that the best strategy to reduce the size of the LCC depended on 60 
the topology of the network that is attacked. For real-world networks, the removal of 61 
nodes using betweenness centrality as importance criterion was consistently the most 62 
efficient attack strategy. In addition, we found that for some networks an attack strategy 63 
can be more efficient than others up to a certain fraction of nodes removed, but other 64 
attack strategies can become more efficient after that fraction of nodes has been removed.  65 
2.Methods 66 
2.1 Attack strategies 67 
We attacked the networks by sequentially removing nodes following some importance 68 
criteria. We compared the efficiency of a pool of attacks strategies, some of which have 69 
been already described in the literature while others are introduced in this work for the 70 
first time. Most of the analyses on the robustness of network when have investigated the 71 
effect of removing nodes according to their rank (i.e. number of links) or some measures of 72 
centrality [3,10,16]. In this work, we introduce new attack strategies that focus entirely or 73 
in part on less local properties of a node, in particular its number of second neighbors, as 74 
explained in detail below.  75 
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Several indexes and measures have been introduced to describe network damage. In this 76 
work, we use the size of the largest connected component (LCC), i.e. the size of the largest 77 
connected sub-graph in the network [2,3], as a measure of network damage during the 78 
attack. A faster decrease in the size of the LCC indicates a more efficient attack strategy. In 79 
order to compare attack strategies across networks, we used the normalized LCC size with 80 
respect to the starting LCC size, i.e. the number of nodes in the LCC before any removal. 81 
For each attack strategy, we applied both the recalculated and non-recalculated methods. 82 
In the recalculated method, the property of the node relevant for the attack strategy (e.g. 83 
number of links) was recalculated after each node removal. In the non-recalculated 84 
method, the property of the node was computed before the first node removal and was 85 
not updated during the sequential deletion of nodes. An attack strategy is less efficient 86 
than another when a higher the fraction of nodes has to be removed to reduce the LCC to 87 
zero (or any other size). With q we indicate the fraction of nodes removed during the 88 
sequential removal of nodes.  89 
We used 2 attack strategies that have been already described in the literature. First-degree 90 
neighbors (First): nodes are sequentially removed according to the number of first 91 
neighbors of each node (i.e. node rank). In the case of ties (i.e. nodes with the same rank), 92 
the sequence of removal of nodes is randomly chosen. Nodes betweenness centrality (Bet): 93 
nodes are sequentially removed according to their betweenness centrality, which is the 94 
number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others that pass through that node [3,17].  95 
We introduced in this paper the following new attack strategies. Second-degree neighbors 96 
(Sec): nodes are sequentially removed according to the number of second neighbors of 97 
each node. Second neighbors of node j are nodes that have a node in common with, but 98 
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are not directly connected to, node j. First + Second neighbors (F+S): nodes are deleted 99 
according to the sum of first and second neighbors of each node. Combined first and second 100 
degree (Comb): nodes are removed according to their rank. In the case of ties, nodes are 101 
removed according to their second degree.  102 
For all attack nodes were sequentially removed from most to least connected, or in case of 103 
Bet, from higher to lower betweenness centrality.   104 
2.2 Networks 105 
We tested the attack strategies described in Section 2.2 on (i) 3 types of model networks 106 
and (ii) 3 real world networks.  107 
The networks we used are undirected and unweighted graphs in which nodes are 108 
connected by links or edges, and rank k of a node is the number of links of that node. Each 109 
link may represent several real world interactions. For instance, in social networks links 110 
between nodes represent interactions between individuals or groups, such as 111 
co-authorship in scientific publications or friendship [2]. In cellular networks, nodes are 112 
chemicals species connected by chemical reactions [18], while in ecological networks links 113 
describe the trophic interactions between species or group of species, e.g. the energy and 114 
matter passing from prey to predator [6,14,19,20]. 115 
2.2.1 Model networks 116 
We tested the attack strategies on (i) Erdos and Renyi graphs [21], (ii) Barabasi and Albert 117 
preferential attachment networks [2], and (iii) scale-free network configuration models 118 
[22]. For each model network, we tested models of different size, as explained below. Since 119 
each model network is a random realization of the network-generating mechanism, we 120 
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tested the attack strategies on 50 random realizations of each model network used the 121 
mean of the normalized LCC size at each fraction q of nodes removed as a measure of 122 
network damage. We observed a small variation of LCC size at each fraction q of nodes 123 
removed across different realizations of networks, thus the mean LCC size across 124 
replicates well represents the overall behavior of the attack strategy. 125 
The Erdos and Renyi (ER) model generates a random graph with N nodes connected by L 126 
links, which are chosen randomly with an occupation probability p from Lmax = N(N-1)/2 127 
possible links, i.e. p is the proportion of realized links from Lmax. The expected number of 128 
links is <L> = (N2p)/2 and the expected rank of a node is <k> = Np. The random graph can 129 
be defined by the number of nodes N and the probability p, i.e. ER(N,p) [21]. We analyzed 130 
ER graphs with different values of N and p, namely: ER(N = 500, p = 0.008),  ER(1 000, 131 
0.004), ER(10 000, 0.0004).  132 
The Barabasi and Albert preferential attachment network (BA) is created starting from few 133 
isolated nodes and then growing the network by adding new nodes and links [2]. At each 134 
step in the creation of the network, one node and m outgoing links from the new node are 135 
added to the network. The probability  that the new node will be connected to node i 136 
already in the network is function of the degree ki of node i, such that 
1
( ) /
j
i i j
j N
k k k


   (i.e. 137 
preferential attachment, since more connected nodes are more likely to be connected to the 138 
new node) [2]. The BA network is defined by parameters N and m, i.e. BA(N,m). We built 139 
BA scale free networks with parameters BA(N=500, m = 2),  BA(1 000, 2), BA(10 000, 2).  140 
We created networks with power-law degree distribution using the configuration model 141 
for generalized random graphs [2,22,]. This model is defined as follows.  A discrete degree 142 
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distribution P(K = k) = k -α is defined, such that P(k) is the proportion of nodes in the 143 
network having degree k. The maximum node degree kmax is equal to N, where N is the 144 
number of nodes. The domain of the discrete function P(k) becomes (1, kmax). We generated 145 
the degree sequence of the nodes by randomly drawing N values k1,…,kn from the degree 146 
distribution. Then, for each node i we drew a link with node j with probability P(ki)P(kj.) A 147 
scale free configuration model network is defined by parameters N, α and <k>. We 148 
analyzed scale free network with parameters CM(N = 500, α = 2.5, <k> = 3.8), CM(1 149 
000,2.5,3.8), CM(10 000,2.5,3.9).  150 
2.2.2 Real world networks 151 
We tested the attack strategies on the following real-world networks: (i) The Gnutella P2P 152 
(peer-to-peer) network (Gnutella) [24], (ii) the email network of the University Rovira i 153 
Virgili (URV) in Tarragona, Spain (Email) [25], and (iii) the immunoglobulin interaction 154 
network (Immuno) [26]. Nodes of Gnutella (N=8846, L=31839) represent hosts in the peer-155 
to-peer network while links represent connections between the hosts [24]. E-mail (N=1134, 156 
L=10902) provides a representative example of the flow of information within a human 157 
organization [25]. Immuno is the undirected and connected graph of interactions in the 158 
immunoglobulin protein (N = 1316, L = 6300) where nodes represent amino acids and two 159 
amino acids are linked if they interact in the immunoglobulin protein [26]. 160 
3. Results 161 
3.1 Non-Recalculated method 162 
3.1.1 Model networks (Fig. 1) 163 
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ER: For all sizes of networks, the 5 attack strategies were equally efficient in reducing the 164 
size of the LCC up to q ~= 0.2. For q >0.2, First was the most efficient strategy to reduce the 165 
size of the LCC.  166 
CM: For N = 500, Comb was the most efficient strategy early in the removal sequence., 167 
while First became the most efficient strategy after q > 0.1. For N = 1 000, Comb, Bet, and 168 
First had the same efficiency. For N = 10 000, Comb, Bet, and First were equally efficient up 169 
to q = 0.1, while for q > 0.1 First was the most efficient strategy.  170 
BA:  For N = 500, First, Comb and Bet were equally efficient in reducing the size of the LCC. 171 
For bigger networks, First, Comb and Bet were equally efficient up to q = 0.8 (N = 1 000) 172 
and q = 0.5 (N = 10 000). Then, Bet became more efficient than First and Comb. 173 
3.1.2 Real-world networks (Fig. 2) 174 
Email: Bet was the most efficient strategy to reduce LCC up to q~= 0.3. For greater 175 
fractions of nodes removed, First and Comb were slightly more efficient than Bet. 176 
Immuno: Bet was distinctly more efficient than other strategies up to q = 0.55. For q > 0.55, 177 
all strategies were equally efficient. 178 
Gnutella: Bet was the most efficient attack strategy.  179 
3.2 Recalculated 180 
3.2.1 Model networks (Fig. 3) 181 
ER: First and Comb were the most efficient strategies to reduce the LCC up to q~=0.2. 182 
Beyond that fraction of nodes removed, Bet became more efficient than First. Sec was the 183 
least efficient strategy. 184 
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CM: Comb was the most efficient strategy up to q~=0.1. Beyond that, Bet was the most 185 
efficient strategy, while Sec was the least efficient strategies. 186 
BA: Comb was the most efficient strategy up to q~=0.1. First, F+S and Bet attack induced a 187 
slightly slower decrease in LCC size. When q reached 0.1, Bet became the most efficient 188 
strategy. Sec was the least efficient strategy. 189 
3.2.2 Real-world networks (Fig. 4) 190 
Email: All attack strategies were equally efficient up to q = 0.12. For q > 0.12 Bet was the 191 
most efficient attack strategy.  192 
Immuno: Bet was largely the most efficient attack strategy. 193 
Gnutella: All attack strategies were equally efficient up to q = 0.1. For q > 0.1 Bet was the 194 
most efficient attack strategy.  195 
4. Discussion 196 
We discuss the following main results of our work: (i) attacks were largely more efficient 197 
(i.e. smaller fraction of nodes deleted to achieve the same reduction in LCC size) with the 198 
recalculated than with the non-recalculated method; (ii) the efficiency of attack strategies 199 
on model networks depended on network topology; (iii) the sequential removal of nodes 200 
according to their betweenness centrality was the most efficient attack to real-world 201 
networks; (iv) for some networks, the relative efficiency of attack strategies changed 202 
during the removal sequence. 203 
We found that the recalculated method provided more efficient attacks than the non-204 
recalculated method, i.e. for a given fraction of nodes removed a larger reduction of LCC 205 
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was obtained with the recalculated method.  This result confirms the findings of other 206 
analyses on robustness of networks [2,3], which found that updated information on the 207 
topology of the system after each removal allowed for more efficient attacks to networks.  208 
However, non-recalculated attack strategies are implemented in various relevant settings 209 
and are equivalent in practice to the simultaneous removal of nodes, as it happens in the 210 
case of vaccination campaigns  (i.e. vaccinating at the same time nodes of the contact 211 
network with the highest probability of acquiring or transmitting the disease) or attacks to 212 
computer networks [11].  213 
For model networks, the efficiency of the attack strategies depended on network topology. 214 
In the case of networks with power-law degree distribution, the efficiency of the attack 215 
strategies depended also on network size. Across all model networks and considering both 216 
the non-recalculated and recalculated methods, attack strategies based on either the 217 
betweenness centrality of nodes or node rank were the most efficient ones. However, the 218 
sequential deletion of nodes according to their betweenness centrality was consistently the 219 
most efficient attack strategy to real-world networks, with the only exception of the attack 220 
to the Email network with the non-recalculated method. While in some cases Bet was 221 
slightly more efficient than other strategies in reducing the size of the largest connected 222 
component, in others Bet was largely the most efficient strategy. For example, in the 223 
immunoglobulin interaction network, deleting a very small fraction of nodes with high 224 
betweenness centrality reduced the size of the normalized LCC of more than 60% using 225 
either the recalculated and non-recalculated method, while for the same fractions of nodes 226 
removed other attack strategies were able to obtain only a 1-5% reduction in LCC size. 227 
Betweenness centrality describes how “central” a node is in the network by considering 228 
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the fraction of shortest paths that pass through that node [17]. Nodes with betweenness 229 
centrality greater than 0 play a major role in connecting areas of the network that would 230 
otherwise be either sparsely connected or disconnected [23]. This makes betweenness 231 
centrality an important centrality measure for a social, technological, computer, and 232 
biological networks. The higher efficiency of the strategy based on node betweenness 233 
centrality with respect to the attack based on node rank in real-world networks can be 234 
explained by the fact that in real-world networks some of the critical nodes (i.e. nodes 235 
whose persistence strongly contribute to maintaining network integrity) are either not 236 
highly linked, or that the highly linked nodes are not located in the network core [23]. 237 
The newly-introduced Combined attack strategy, when recalculated, was the most efficient 238 
strategy to decrease LCC size in the scale free network configuration model and in the 239 
Barabasi-Albert model up to q = 0.1, performing slightly better than the attack based on 240 
node rank (First strategy). The Combined attack first select nodes according to their rank, 241 
then, in the case of ties (i.e. nodes with the same rank), it sequentially removes nodes 242 
according to their second degree. On the contrary, in the case of ties First randomly 243 
chooses the removal sequence for the nodes with the same rank. Thus, at the beginning of 244 
the attack to the network, when two or more major hubs have the same number of links to 245 
other nodes, selecting to remove first the hub with the greatest second degree causes a 246 
faster decrease in LCC size than to randomly select the removal sequence for those hubs.  247 
Later in the attack, the Combined strategy was less efficient than the First strategy to attack 248 
scale free networks; this might be due to the fact that after a certain fraction of hubs has 249 
been deleted, removing first (in the case of ties) the node(s) with the highest second 250 
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degree(s) would remove more peripheral and less important nodes. Those nodes are less 251 
likely to be part of the largest connected component.  252 
Lastly, the efficiency of attack strategies changed along the sequential removal of nodes. 253 
This was particularly evident for networks with power-law degree distribution. It follows 254 
that the percolation threshold, i.e. the fraction of nodes removed for which the size of the 255 
largest connected component reaches zero, might be for some networks little correlated 256 
with the fraction of nodes to be removed in order to reduce the largest connected 257 
component to a size greater than 0. This result has important implications for applied 258 
network science and deserves further investigations. For example, in the case of 259 
immunization strategies, choosing the attack strategy according to the percolation 260 
threshold may be of little use when the goal is to reduce as much as possible the size of 261 
LCC with just a few targeted immunizations.  262 
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Figures 305 
 306 
Figure 1. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for non-recalculated 307 
targeted attacks to model networks. Points are plotted every 20 nodes removed for networks with N 308 
= 500 and N =1 000, and every 200 nodes removed for N =10000. 309 
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 310 
Figure 2. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for non-recalculated 311 
targeted attacks to real-world networks. Points are plotted every 50 nodes removed for Email and 312 
Immuno networks, and every 200 nodes removed for Gnutella. 313 
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 314 
Figure 3. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for recalculated targeted 315 
attacks to model networks. Points are plotted every 20 nodes removed for networks with N = 500 316 
and N =1 000, and every 200 nodes removed for N =10000. 317 
 318 
Figure 4. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for recalculated targeted 319 
attacks to real-world networks. Points are plotted every 50 nodes removed for Email and Immuno 320 
networks, and every 200 nodes removed for Gnutella. 321 
 322 
